01/08/2026
Crowdstrike announces acquisition of SGNL.
At least mildly interesting and somewhat informative.
Business and digital security, while adjacent to political activity, the two or three should not be confused, in general. OCS, however, does consider how politics and totalitarian power affect security and the value of entities specializing in providing security.
Case in point, Kaspersky was a long time/stalwart in the security industry. However, with the advent of state sponsored/directed security actions/violations and the totalitarian government of Russia, where Kaspersky lives, suddenly, we felt that we had to drop Kaspersky (aka Kaspersky Lab) as a recommended anti-malware (AM) product provider. The concern being that they/he could be subject to the whims of their government dictator, who has oft demonstrated more than a tendency to strong-arm Russia based businesses (and a few EU entities) to impact the security and wellbeing of targeted external (and internal) entities, individuals and otherwise.
Therefore, Kaskpersky was dropped from the OCS list of recommended AM and other security products/offerings.
"Security" enterprises/entities that either dabble or wholeheartedly involve their businesses and activities thereof in political actions are also avoided in the recommendations provided by OCS.
Regardless of one's politics, Crowdstrike falls under the latter category, based on the observations of OCS, we have found that Crowdstrike has involved themselves in entering the field of political narrative, issuing consultative communications regarding data access and even been involved in data verification and disposal in ways that indicate a political motivation rather than a strictly agnostic technical and security based motivation.
It is for the latter reason(s) that OCS has not recommended Crowdstrike products nor placing any weight in Crowdstrike reports, recommendations or any other communications as reliable from a pure security perspective for our clients.
Further, whenever an entity/corporation acquires another otherwise recommended security concern, OCS feels that we must assume the worst for the function of such acquired concern's functions into the foreseeable future. Not only has this been a logic OCS has taken after much thought, we have found it to be sound logic via experience over decades.
Thus, OCS feels we must take the same stance for SGNL and their offerings. That is, we may support any existing installations currently supported by our clients and OCS, however, we would recommend against acquiring any additional offerings of products and would heavily question any documents, recommendations and other communications from that firm for the foreseeable future.
Of course, when Putin is no longer in power, we will reevaluate Kaspersky's situation and when Crowdstrike fails or otherwise is no longer in control of SGNL, we will reevaluate SGNL as well.
We would note one momentary exception to this logic. When Symantec acquired Norton, we pulled clients away from Norton AM products. While that did prove appropriate from experience, Norton's founder, Peter Norton "came back" to Norton (as a subdivision of Symantec) and we noted that, within months the product suddenly lost all the issues that it had acquired from Symantec (issues that Symantec's own products (such as Symantec AV) experienced prior to Symantec acquiring Norton and adopting it (dropping Symantec AV). Hence, when finding Norton installed on a client station, we no longer removed it as a first response to see "if that fixed the issue" (previously, that had proved VERY effective for both Symantec AV and later Norton after Peter Norton left the acquired Norton within Symantec).
We found that as long as Peter Norton remained with the company, his namesake products all performed efficiently and did not introduce oddball problems for hosts upon which they were installed.
Later, when he left Symantec again, we watched and the same issues creeped back into Norton products and we resumed our former practices of recommending against Symantec/Norton products and immediate removal, when allowed, when diagnosing any given issue on a problematic system (which proved to save us time and our clients money for diagnostics & fixes of said issues).
Conversely, one unnamed financial institution REQUIRES Norton on at least some of the stations over which they have "compliance" authority. Only in such a situation, do we support Norton products. In such situations, while it costs time and client money, we have mitigated the ill affects of said products through use of more powerful systems (to compensate for the induced lethargy) and additional efforts to strip out any unneeded products on those systems to "lighten the load" as much as feasible, allowing them to operate at a reasonable pace.
Regarding SGNL, going forward, OCS will endeavor to find alternative options when faced with supporting clients who/that use or are faced with using its products.